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of finance of the City of New York in accordance with' CPLR 2601.
Any subsequent withdrawal of the amount must be made in accordance with the provisions of CPLR 26-07 less any applicable
fees as provided for in CPLR 8010.
Collateral Estoppel: Available where issues identical and parties
all before court in prior action.
In Cummings v. Dresher,1 A, B, and X were involved ih an
automobile accident. X, a passenger in the car A was driving, and A
brought separate suits which were tried jointly against B in federal
court. A was denied recovery because of his contributory negligence.
The jury also concluded, albeit gratuitously, that B was negligent.
X recovered in his action against B when the jury found B negligent.
Subsequently, B commenced an action against A in the New-York
Supreme Court on facts arising from the same accident.
In denying A's motion for summary judgment, the appellate
division, third department,12 held that A could not assert the
defense of collateral estoppel against B since, in the action of A
against B, the jury's finding as to B's negligence was "gratuitous."
Also, A could not assert the finding of B's negligence in the action
by X against B since, presumably under the test "established in
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.,83 the issues must be identical for the
defensive assertion of collateral estoppel. In the court's opinion,
the issue of B's contributory negligence toward A was different
84
from the issue of B's negligence toward X. The Court of Appeals,
in reversing the appellate division, stated that it could find no
reason for requiring the issue of negligence to be relitigated since
it was already decided in a jury trial where both. parties were
present.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been a changing concept
in the New York courts. Traditionally, a defendant would be
allowed to assert collateral estoppel only where the plaintiff would
have the same right defensively. 5 This necessitated that the defendant be a party or privy in the previous suit,18 for otherwise
the plaintiff would not be able to assert that suit's finding against
8143 Misc. 2d 556, 251 N.Y.S.2d

1964).
8

2 Cummings
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598 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County
I

v. Dresher, 24 App. Div. 2d 912, 264 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d
Dep't 1965), affirming, 43 Misc. 2d .556, 251 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct.
Schenectady County 1964).
83 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
8
4 Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y2d 105, 218 N.E2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d

97685(1966).

Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S.
111, 127 (1912).
88 See 1B MooRE, FEDmaR. PRAc'.cE ff 0.412(1), at 1801 (2d ed. 1965).
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the defendant in a subsequent suit. However, in Israel v. Wood
Dolson Co.,87 the Court of Appeals held that where the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is asserted defensively, "the test to be applied is that of 'identity of issues.' "88 In such a case the mutuality
requirement is abandoned.
While Israel only required that the issues in the subsequent
action be identical, the Court in Cummings not only noted an
identity of issues, but also an identity of parties. It seems, therefore, that the Court was reluctant to apply the "identity of issues"
test as the sole criterion for the defensive assertion of collateral
estoppel in negligence cases. There is a fundamental policy consideration behind this reluctance by the Court, which can be
illustrated by a situation wherein there is more than one possible
plaintiff. In such an instance, there is always the possibility .of a
collusive suit, wherein a favorable judgment obtained by the
defendant could be used to collaterally estop subsequent plaintiffs.
While Cummings does not overrule Israel,"" it evidences an
apparent reluctance on the part of the Court of Appeals to apply
the "identity of issues" test as the sole criterion for the defensive
assertion of collateral estoppel. It appears that future cases will be
decided on their own merits, within the guidelines set up by
Israel and Cummings. The test may very well now be "identity
of issues plus ......
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CPLR 4504: Amendment.
The section, as amended, declares that a person authorized
"to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed
practical nursing or dentistry" cannot disclose confidential information acquired from a patient while acting within his professional capacity.
CPLR 4533-a: Amendment.
As a result of this new rule, an itemized repair bill-which
is receipted and marked paid-for property damage to a motor
vehicle in an amount of less than three hundred dollars is now
prima facie evidence of the reasonable value of the repairs itemized
in an action or counterclaim for such damages.
The repair bill must be verified by a proper party. It must
state (1) that no refund has or will be made to the claimant,
87

1 N.Y2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).

881d. at

120, 134 N.E.2d at 100, 151 N.Y.S2d at 5. See The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JoHI'1's L. Rv. 121, 148 (1966).
89 It is to be noted that Chief judge Desmond, who wrote the majority
opinion in Cummings, concurred in the majority opinion in Israel.

